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By Marc I. Steinberg*
and John M. Koneck**

Federalism, the Tenth Amendment

And the Legal Profession: The Power
Of a Federal Judge to Restrain a
Convicted Attorney, as a Condition of
Probation, from Practicing in
The State Courts
I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the power of a federal judge, when sentencing an attorney who has been convicted of a federal felony to
a term of probation, to order that the attorney refrain from engaging in the practice of law in the state courts. This issue was recently before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in United States v. Pastore.' In that case, the defendant,
an attorney, was found guilty of wilfully and knowingly filing a
false income tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) .2 The
presiding district court judge sentenced him to a term of probation.
Deriving his power from 18 U.S.C. § 3651, which provides that "[a
defendant may be] placed on probation for such period and upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems best,"3 the district
judge ordered that the defendant resign from the state bar.4 On
appeal, the defendant challenged the authority of the district court
to impose such a condition of probation. Although expressing
doubts concerning the sentencing judge's authority to order the con* A.B. 197Z University of Michigan; J.D. 1975, University of California,
Los Angeles; LL.M. 1977, Yale University. Member, California Bar.
**

B.S., North Dakota State University; J.D. Candidate, June 1978, Yale

University.

1. 537 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1976).
2. I.R.C. § 7206(1).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970).

After examining the statute the Pastore court

noted that "[iut would be hard to use more general words." 537 F.2d

at 680.
4. 537 F.2d at 677.
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dition, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit neither focused
on that problem nor did it consider the constitutional issues raised
by the defendant. Rather, the court held that under the circumstances involved and "in the exercise of [its] supervisory power
• . .this particular condition of probation was improper." 5 Concurring in the majority's opinion, Judge Lumbard asserted that a
federal court has no authority whatsoever to affect the right of
an attorney to practice in state courts. 6
5. Id. at 677.
6. Id. at 684 (Lumbard, J., concurring). A distinction must be made between the federal judge's power to control an attorney's practice in
federal courts and his power to control an attorney's practice in state
courts. This article concerns only the latter issue.
A directly related question is the authority of a state court judge
to restrain a convicted attorney, as a condition of probation, from practicing in the federal courts. In Yarbrough v. State, 166 S.E.2d 35 (Ga.
App. 1969), an attorney was convicted in a state court for forgery of
a warranty deed. The trial judge sentenced him to a twelve month
probation term with the condition that he not engage in the practice
of law in courts within the state during that period. On appeal, the
Georgia Court of Appeals, upholding the condition, said that the trial
judge needed this power in order to protect state citizens and the
integrity of the state courts. Id. at 36. The court's opinion did not
specify whether the condition limited only the attorney's practice
in state courts, or whether it also applied to his practice in federal
courts within Georgia. If it were meant to reach both, the arguments that this article presents concerning the attempt by a federal judge to control an attorney's practice in state courts would also
apply to the state judge's order to the extent that it affected the attorney's federal court practice.
But the applicability of these constitutional arguments to the state
judge's order may be limited. In Ginsburg v. Kovrak, 392 Pa. 143,
139 A.2d 889 (1958), appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 52 (1958) (dismissed
for lack of substantial federal question), an attorney, who was admitted to practice before numerous federal courts including the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, was enjoined by the Philadelphia Bar
Association from practicing law because he was not authorized by the
state to practice law before Pennsylvania state courts. The injunction
prohibited him from practicing anywhere in Philadelphia except
within the actual confines of the federal court buildings. On appeal,
the attorney argued that a state court could not limit -hisfederal practice in this way. To this assertion the court responded:
We do not presume to tell the Federal Courts whom they
should or should not appoint as referees, special masters,
amici curiae, and the like, for the prosecution of their work
as they see it. That is a different matter from deciding what
qualifications are needed by Pennsylvania citizens facing and
affecting each other before the Bar in any court of law, State
or Federal. In such matters we are State citizens before we
are federal citizens, which is another way of saying that the
States have not ceded to the Federal Government the right
to qualify their lawyers.
139 A.2d at 892. Contra,Ex parte McCue, 211 Cal. 57, 293 P. 47 (1930).

LEGAL PROFESSION
From Pastore, it is clear that federal judges derive their extensive power to impose conditions of probation from 18 U.S.C. §
3651. Utilizing this almost unlimited grant of authority, federal
judges frequently require that convicted felons, as a condition of7
probation, refrain from engaging in certain types of employment.
Although McCue presented facts similar to those in Ginsburg, the California court reached an opposite result. The court declared that:
The State Bar Act and other statutes enacted for the purpose
of regulating the practice of law in this state are applicable
to our state courts only. The federal courts are governed entirely by federal enactment and their own rules as to admission and professional conduct. This state, should it attempt
to regulate the practice of law in the federal courts or
to place any restrictions or limitations upon the persons who
might appear before the federal courts within this state, would
be acting entirely without right and beyond its jurisdiction.
Id. at 66, 293 P. at 51 (citations omitted).
7. E.g., United States v. Nu-Triumph, Inc., 500 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1974)
(corporation found guilty of transporting obscene material through
the mails was ordered not to engage in the distribution of obscene material); Whaley v. United States, 324 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 911 (1964) (person convicted of impersonating an
F.B.I. agent was ordered to give up his job in the repossession business); Barnhill v. United States, 279 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960) (four gamblers convicted of attempting to
evade federal gambling taxes were required to refrain from practicing
their chosen profession, i.e., gambling); Stone v. United States, 153
F.2d 331 (9th Cir. 1946) (five railroad dining hall stewards, who
pleaded nolo contendere to charges of unlawful conspiracy to take
money from dining cars moving in interstate commerce, were ordered
to refrain from interstate employment on railroad cars); United States
v. Greenhaus, 85 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1936) (defendant, convicted of violating federal security laws, was prohibited from taking part in any
stock or bond sale).
State judges, through sentencing authority as broad as that granted
to federal judges, have also imposed conditions affecting employment.
See, e.g., United States v. Villarin Gerena, 553 F.2d 723 (1st Cir. 1977)
(member of the Puerto Rico police force, who struck a private citizen
numerous times and then arrested him without probable cause, was
sentenced to a term of probation conditioned upon his resignation from
the police force); Bricker v. Michigan Parole Bd., 405 F. Supp. 1340
(E.D. Mich. 1975) (defendant convicted of grand theft ordered not to
engage in the furnace or heating business); Yarbrough v. State, 166
S.E.2d 35 (Ga. App. 1969) (supra note 6); People v. Bresin, 245 Cal.
App. 2d 232, 53 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1966) (person convicted of grand theft
and forgery required not to accept employment that would put him
in a position to make sales to public); People v. Caruso, 174 Cal. App.
2d 624, 345 P.2d 282, 1 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1959) (defendant ordered to
remain out of the automobile business); People v. Osslo, 50 Cal. 2d
75, 323 P.2d 397 (1958) (union members convicted of assault and related offenses barred from holding any union position or receiving any
remuneration from any union); People v. Frank, 94 Cal. App. 2d
740, 211 P.2d 350 (1949) (pediatrician, found guilty of contributing to
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This broad delegation of power has been sharply attacked by both
the judiciary and law review commentators. 8 Perhaps in partial
response to this criticism, 9 a bill, the Criminal Code Reform Act
of 1977,10 has been introduced in Congress. This bill, the current
version of the ill-fated "S.1,"" delineates more precisely the federal
judge's probation condition power. Section 2103(b) (6) of the bill
12

declares:

[T] he court may provide, as further conditions of a sentence to probation ... that the defendant-

(6) refrain from engaging in a specified occupation, business,
or profession bearing a reasonable relationship to the offense, or
engage in such a specified occupation, business, or profession only
under stated circumstances.
The scant legislative history of this section, as it appeared in
"S. 1," does not describe how section 2103 (b) (6) was formulated. 18
the delinquency of a minor and committing a lewd and lascivious act,
was ordered to refrain from the practice of medicine). But see People
v. Brown, 272 N.E.2d 252 (Ill. 1971) (trial court ordered that a probationer, who made his living as a tavern operator, not frequent any
bar or tavern where alcoholic beverages are served; however, the
Illinois Supreme Court reversed this order because it found that there
was no direct connection between employment in a tavern and an
assault conviction).
For a discussion of probation conditions generally, see Best & Birzon, Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51 GEo. L.J. 809 (1963);
Note, Creative Punishment: A Study of Effective Sentencing Alternatives, 14 WAsHBURN L.J. 57 (1975); Note, Judicial Review of Probation
Conditions,67 CoLuvr. L. REV. 181 (1967).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 680-82 (2d Cir. 1976);
Best & Brzon, Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51 GEo. L.J. 809,
834-35 (1963).
9. See Hearings on the Reform -of the Federal Criminal Laws Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary,92nd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I,§ 3103 at 432-33 (1971). Discussing a possible change in the probation condition power of a federal
judge, a comment to this section states that, "Title 18 U.S.C. § 3651
contains a short list of possible conditions of probation. This section
[a proposed, but unadopted, successor to § 3651] provides a more elaborate statement of the conditions of probation in order to promote a
more uniform and considered approach to probation." Id. at 434.
10. S.1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See also Federal Criminal Law
Revision and ConstitutionalRights PreservationAct of 1976, H.R. 2311,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2103 (b) (6) (1977).
11. S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
12. This provision appeared, without change, in "S.1." S. 1, 94th Cong.,
lst Sess. § 2103 (b) (6) (1975).
13. For a history of the development of S. 1, see Crystal, The Proposed
Federal Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975: Sentencing-Law and
Order with a Vengeance, 7 SEroN HALL. L. REv. 33 (1975).
It has been stated that "S. 1" was developed from, among other

LEGAL PROFESSION
The proposal, as originally introduced in 1973,14 however, sheds
some light on this issue. Section 1-4A3 (b) of the original bill states
that:
[A] member of a licensed profession convicted of an offense may,
as part of his sentence, be disqualified... from practicing his profession or may be required to... practice such profession subject

to a specified condition for such period, not in excess of the authorized term of imprisonment for such offense, as the court may determine to be in the interest of justice.
This provision was eliminated from the bill reintroduced in 1975
and 1977. Although the reason for the deletion is not entirely clear,
one explanation is that the harsh criticism directed at the proposal
from many authorities, including the Justice Department, 15
sources, a report submitted by the National Commission on Reform
of Federal Criminal Laws, the American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code, and the American Bar Association's Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice. Report of the Comm. on the Judiciary of
the United States Senate to Accompany S. 1, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., vol.
II at 9-11 (1974). Neither the Brown Commission's proposed legislation, supra note 9, nor ABA STANDARDs RELATING TO PROBATION, § 3.2,
44-45, 48 (1970), explicitly grants to a federal judge the power to forbid an attorney from practicing law in state courts.
The Committee Report discussing section 2103 (b) (6) of S. 1 states
that:
The condition is stated ... to relate the proscribed occupation
to the nature of the offense. Thus, a bank teller who embezzles funds might be required not to engage in an occupation
involving the handling of funds in a fiduciary capacity.
COMIRE or THE JUDICIARY, REPORT TO AccoapAnY S. 1, CnvAL
JUSTICE CODIFIcATION, REVIsION, Am REFORm ACT OF 1974, S. REP. No.

94, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 905 (1974) (footnote omitted).
A footnote to the above quotation assures the reader that "[tihe
constitutional permissibility of such a condition has ben [sic] recog.nized. See Whaley v. United States, 324 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 911 (1964)." Id. at 889 n.15. The report never mentions the applicability of the condition to members of state-regulated
professions.
14. S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
15. Hearings on the Reform of the Federal CriminalLaws Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Proceduresof the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. XI, 8047 (1974) (statement of John
C. Keeney). When asked about section 1-4A3 (b) of S. 1, Mr. Keeney
declared that "[t]he Department [of Justice] preferred to leave [disqualification decisions] to the federal, state, and local licensing authorities, except as such power might be exercised as a condition of
probation or parole." Id. at 8066. Albeit Mr. Keeney implied that
the Department of Justice was opposed to the disqualification provision found within section 1-4A3 (b), he offered no reasons for this opposition. More importantly, he failed to consider the problems of, or
provide support for, the alternative solution favored by the Justice Department.
But criticism of this provision was not universal. See Hearings on
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prompted its removal. The commentators argued that the section
invaded the reserved powers guaranteed to the states by the tenth
amendment to the United States Constitution, 16 that it was unnecessary because state licensing authorities already regulated the conduct of professionals holding state licenses, 17 and that the provision
was ambiguous because it provided no definition of the term "proas to when the disqualification penfession" and gave no guidance
8
alty should be imposed.'
As the above discussion demonstrates, federal judges enjoy immense power under either 18 U.S.C. § 3651, or its proposed successor,
section 2103(b) (6),19 to impose conditions of probation on members
of the legal profession who have been convicted of federal felonies.
In response to increasing public criticism of lawyers, due generally
20
to unscrupulous conduct by certain members of the profession,
federal courts must become more willing to administer strict penalties against attorneys who violate the law. 2 1 Included among the
array of possible sanctions at the disposal of federal judges ip an
order restraining a defendant, as a condition of probation, from
practicing law in both the federal and state courts. Although this

16.
17.
18.

19.
20.

21.

the Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. XI, 7863 (1974) (statement of Ralph Nader).
Mr. Nader asseverated that "[s]uch a sanction is valuable, but it should
be complemented by an affirmative authority for the courts to order
the offender to perform socially useful activity." Id. at 7880. Another
legal writer failed to discuss the applicability of the provision to attorneys. However, he did note its possible repercussions for an attorney's
clients. Maddock, The Proposed Criminal Code: Business Lawyer
Beware, 29 Bus. LAw. 711, 719-21 (1974).
Cohen, Failure to File Tax Returns and Professional Discipline, 49
L.A. B. Buu.. 328 (1974).
Halverson, Antitrust and the Proposed Revision of Federal Criminal
Laws: An Evaluation of Substantive Changes and Penalties, 1974
ANTITRUST L.J. 419, 426.
The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Special Comm. on the
Proposed New Federal Criminal Code, Three Versions of the Proposed
New Federal Criminal Code 78 (1974), reprinted in Hearings on the
Reform of the Federal CriminalLaws Before the Subcmm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt XI at 7771 (1974).
See note 10 supra.
See Branca & Steinberg, Attorney Fee Schedules and Legal Advertising: The Implications of Goldfarb, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 475, 514 (1977);
Brink, Who Will Regulate the Bar? 61 A.B.A. J. 936, 937 (1975); Waltz,
The Unpopularity of Lawyers in America, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REv., 143,
144-45 (1976).
See United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d at 684 (Lumbard, J., concur-

ring).

LEGAL PROFESSION
sanction may appear at first glance to be a viable one, it raises grave
social policy and constitutional issues that affect the essence of federal-state relations. It is the purpose of this article to analyze these
problems and to reach a conclusion that is consistent with both the
tenth amendment and the concept of federalism.
II. SOCIAL POLICY ANALYSIS
Aside from constitutional considerations, the propriety of action
by a federal judge restraining a convicted attorney from practicing
in the state courts must be examined. First, contentions supporting a federal court's entrance into this area are considered. This
is followed by an inquiry into factors mandating that the states
remain the sole regulators of the legal profession.
In support of federal court intervention, one must begin the analysis by noting that today public opinion of the legal profession
is extremely low. 22

The public's disrespect stems, in part, from a

perception that, once admitted to practice, members of the profession are not effectively disciplined. 23 Since the states have not fulfilled their obligation to regulate the profession, perhaps the federal
government
should be provided with the machinery to administer
24
this task.
In addition to the preceding argument, pragmatic considerations
support the assumption of this power by a federal judge. First,
in an effort to combat recidivism, a judge needs a wide range of
22. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
23. Richard, Proposalfor a "United States Bar," 58 A.B.A. J. 355 (1975);
Steinberg, The DisciplinaryRules and Competence of Counsel: A Proposed Alternative, 11 GONZAGA L. REv. 133, 133-37 (1975); See generally ABA SPECIAL Coimmw. ON EVALUATION OF DiscIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS Am

MN

RECOMMENDATIONS

IN DIscIINARY ENFORCE-

(1970).

24. See Tunney & Frank, Federal Roles in Lawyer Reform, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 333, 339 (1975). But cf. the congressional enactment of 5 U.S.C.

§ 500(b) (1970) in 1965. This provision eliminated many federal
agency-established admission requirements pertaining to practice by

state licensed attorneys before federal agencies. Opponents of the bill
argued that the lack of uniform admission and disciplinary regulations
among the states necessitated the implementation of these agencypromulgated requirements. They further contended that the requirements were needed in order to bar undesirable attorneys from agency
practice. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1141, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1965), reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWs 4170. These
arguments were rejected by Congress, which felt that surveillance by
the states was a sufficient guarantee of professional integrity. Daley
& Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the
SEC, 24 EMoRY L.J. 747, 780 (1975).
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discretion when choosing appropriate probation conditions.2

5

If a

convicted attorney's practice relates to the illegal acts upon which
his conviction is based, a probation condition restricting his professional activities seems reasonable and even desirable. Second, the
sentencing judge, because of his intimate involvement with the accused during the trial process, is in as good a position as anyone
to appraise the defendant's moral character and his ability to function lawfully within society. 26 Third, timing the imposition of professional discipline to coincide with the felony sentence better protects the public and more adequately assures the defendant a just
determination than does the present bifurcated system. 27 Finally,
since the federal courts depend almost entirely on the states to regulate admission to the legal profession, the federal judiciary needs
this power to protect
is own interest in the fitness of the profes28

sion's members.
Countering the above arguments
the states' retention of sole control
the states have numerous interests
an effective regulation of attorneys.

are considerations that favor
of this area. It is clear that
that are served only through
These interests include a de-

sire to protect state residents, to make sure attorneys know local
laws, and to assure a uniform and efficient administration of the
state judicial system. 29 Turning to the federal courts, one sees that
25. See Note, Creative Punishment: A Study of Effective Sentencing Alternatives, 14 WAsHBURN L.J. 57 (1975); Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions,67 COLUm. L. REV. 181 (1967).
26. Cohen, supra note 16, at 347.
27. Id. But see In re Dreier, 258 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1958). Although not
involving a probation condition, the case recognizes the importance of
providing a convicted attorney with swift professional discipline. After being convicted for the commission of various state offenses, Dreier
was suspended in another state proceeding from the practice of law
in the state courts of Pennsylvania for one year (later reduced to six
months). Four years later, a federal district court suspended his right
to practice before that court solely because of the prior convictions.
The court of appeals reversed the district court's action because the
lower court had not considered whether, in the four years subsequent
to his conviction, Dreier had rehabilitated himself and exhibited good
character. Id. at 69. If a federal judge forbids a convicted attorney
from engaging in the practice of law as a condition of probation, the
public and courts are assured adequate protection, and the delay and
resulting unfairness to the attorney, which required that Dreier be
reversed, are avoided.
28. See Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1356
(E.D.N.C. 1970).
29. See Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25, 25-26 (1961); Barsky v. Board of
Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954). For detailed accounts of the development of state regulation of the legal profession, see R. PoUND, TnE

LEGAL PROFESSION
there is no indication that they will engage in a more efficacious
regulation of the profession than the states have undertaken in the
past. 30 Indeed, because the federal courts, at present, suffer from
an overburdened caseload, allowing them to assume the power to
regulate an attorney's state court practice will increase the burden
that has already been imposed upon them.31
Another argument that may be raised concerns a fundamental
issue of procedural due process, namely, that before an attorney
can be subjected to professional discipline, he must receive notice
of the charges against him and an opportunity to present a defense.3 2 Existing state regulatory mechanisms provide these constitutional safeguards. One must question, however, whether they
are secured when a federal judge imposes restraints 33on an attorney's professional life through a condition of probation.
Related to the above assertion is the contention that state courts
must remain the regulators in this area in order to safeguard the
constitutional rights of attorneys. While state regulatory tribunals
have not always protected the individual rights of attorneys, 34 at
least when the states have egregiously abridged such rights, the
federal judiciary has vigilantly detected these violations. 5 Query,
however, if the federal courts acquire the power directly to control
the practice of state-licensed attorneys, then what mechanism will
act as a second filter to assure that federal judges do not abuse
the rights of convicted attorneys? 36 This problem becomes more
LAWYER FRoM ANTiQUITY TO MODERN TMES (1953), and C. WARRM,

A HISTORY Or TiE AMERIcAN BAR (1911).
30. See generally Note, Disbarment in the Federal Courts, 85

YALE

L.J.

975 (1976).

31. See Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: The Changing Role of
the Federal Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 841, 856-57 (1972). The author commends recent efforts to revise the federal criminal laws. She
feels that this will provide relief from the inefficient and lethargic na-

ture of federal court litigation.

32. See, e.g., Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1873); Nell v.United

States, 450 F.2d 1090, 1093 (4th Cir. 1971).
33. United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d at 682-83.
34. See, e.g., In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Barsky v.Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954).

35. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377
U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
36. See, e.g., Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952), where an attorney
appealed a federal contempt citation. The Court, upholding the lower
court's contempt finding, realized that a judge's "power over counsel,
summary or otherwise, is capable of abuse." The Court further
stated: "Men who make their way to the bench sometimes exhibit
vanity, irascibility, narrowness, arrogance, and other weaknesses to
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evident when one considers both the wide discretion that federal
district judges exercise when sentencing convicted defendants and
the deference with which these sentences are treated by reviewing
courts on appeal. s 7 Thus, only if the federal courts remain in their
overseer role, as opposed to functioning as direct regulators, will
the individual rights of attorneys be adequately guarded.
The last reason for restraining the federal judges' entry into this
realm reflects the ability of federal courts to influence public opinion.38 To a great extent, discipline of the legal profession is regulated by the state courts. 9 When the federal courts assume responsibility in this area, arguably, they indicate a lack of confidence
in the state's concurrent regulation.4" This attitude may be interpreted by the members of the legal profession, and the general populace, as a reflection upon the integrity of state courts.41 Because
the importance of maintaining the public's trust in its state judicial
system cannot be doubted, the federal courts must reinforce this
trust by demonstrating their own faith in that system. The federal judiciary's confidence is felicitously displayed by avoiding
usurpation of the state court's power to discipline its attorneys.
Up to this point, the discussion has focused upon the different
social policy issues raised when a federal judge, as a condition of
probation, restrains a convicted attorney from practicing in the
state courts. The competing arguments are not balanced herein in
which human flesh is heir. Most judges, however, recognize and respect courageous, forthright lawyerly conduct." Id. at 12.

37. See M. FRANxEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, LAW WITHOUT ORDER 39-49, 7585 (1973).
38. Cf. A. COX, TnM WARREN COURT 25-27 (1968).
39. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 547 (1968); Note, Disbarment in the
FederalCourts, 85 YALE L.J. 975, 975-77 (1976).
40. Cf. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 249 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
41. Cf. In re Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1038 (1975), where the court noted:
[An] important policy behind the need to avoid disparate
sanctions by the federal and state courts is the maintenance
of public confidence in our legal system and in the bar ....
Such an anomaly can only lead to confusion in the minds of
the public, which justifiably may speculate why an attorney
not qualified to practice in a federal court has sufficient moral
character to practice in the state court.
Id. at 1106. If public confidence is harmed when the state and federal
governments reach different conclusions about the appropriate professional discipline for a convicted attorney, then it will be harmed to
an ever greater extent if the federal judge goes one step beyond this
and makes a disciplinary decision for the state. By taking that course,
the judge indicates to the public his own lack of confidence in the
state courts.

LEGAL PROFESSION
an effort to recommend a proper resolution, for, in the end, such
a task is reduced to one of individual value preferences. Instead,
the article asserts that these considerations must be disregarded by
the courts because federal encroachment in this area is unconstitutional under either a tenth amendment or federalism analysis.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

The ensuing discussion establishes that the commission of this
probation condition power to a federal judge is unconstitutional.
First, this section will explain how the state's decision-making authority is displaced when a federal court forbids an attorney from
practicing in the state courts as a condition of probation. Next,
it will argue that this displacement is unconstitutional under either
a tenth amendment or federalism analysis. 42 Lastly, it will examine recent efforts made by the federal government to regulate
the legal profession and will attempt to reconcile this federal intervention with the aforementioned constitutional arguments.
A. Displacement of State Authority
When a federal judge forbids a convicted attorney from engaging
in the practice of law as a condition of probation, the judge's discretionary power to limit the individual rights of the attorney, although possibly subject to constitutional challenge, is not the relevant issue upon which to focus for the purposes of this article.48
42. Quite obviously, an analysis based on the tenth amendment is inextricably intertwined with the concept of constitutional federalism.
While both reflect the same considerations, and, in fact, the former
is an enunciation of the latter, each serves to protect state sovereignty
through a different approach. See National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833, 844 (1976), construed in 42 Mo. L. REv. 114, 117-18
(1977). The tenth amendment analysis concentrates on powers implicitly "reserved" to the states by the constitution; the federalism
analysis, emphasizing relationships between specific constitutional
provisions and the structure of the constitution itself, focuses on the
autonomy possessed by the states as governmental entities. See C.
BLACK, PERSPEcrIvES

IN

CoNSTiTuTIoxAL LAW 40

(1963).

But see

Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government,
54 CoLumV. L. Ruv. 543 (1954). A federal judge's attempt to limit an
attorney's state court practice is examined under each approach, first,
to highlight the differences between each analysis, and second, to expose comprehensively the federal judge's unconstitutional usurpation
of state power.
43. This article does not attempt to delineate the extent to which a defendant may be forced to surrender constitutional rights as a condition of
probation.
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Rather, attention must be directed toward the state whose decisionmaking power has been displaced. 44 Phrased another way, after
an attorney has been convicted of a state or federal felony, the question arises whether he possesses the high degree of moral character required of members of the legal profession. But before this
question can be addressed, the initial inquiry must focus upon
which sovereignty, the federal or state government, has jurisdiction
to determine whether the attorney should be permitted to continue
his practice in the state courts. Virtually all states have statutes 45
or decisional law4 6 that allow for the professional discipline of an
attorney who has been convicted of a felony, If, however, the federal judge orders the attorney to refrain from practicing law in the
state courts, that state's right to decide the "fitness to practice"
question has been displaced.
The effect on a state is illustrated by the Pastore case, in which
the federal judge suspended the execution of eighteen months of
a twenty-four month sentence on the condition that the defendant
resign from the bar. 47 Prior to the court's order, the state did not
scrutinize the circumstances surrounding the attorney's conviction
and, hence, made no judgment concerning his fitness for practice
in its courts. Even if the state subsequently had made a determination regarding the attorney's professional character, that judgment
would have no significance. Because the federal judge ordered him
not to practice law in lieu of an additional prison term, Pastore
cannot practice in the state's courts even if allowed that privilege
48
by the state.
Countering this argument is the assertion that the federal judge
could legally have sentenced the attorney to a more severe punish44. See Dorsen, The National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: A
Problem in Federalism, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 45 (1974), where the author
advances an analogous position. He asserts that even though Congress
had a rational basis for concluding that it could enact a national nofault insurance law through its commerce clause power, "[t]he [constitutional] problem [with the proposal] is different. It is centered
on means rather than ends ....
[W]e must focus on the method
chosen to effectuate the no-fault policy." Id. at 47.
45. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE §§ 6101-12 (West 1974); N.Y. JUD.
LAw § 90 (McKinney 1968); Tsx. Rsv. Civ. STAT. A-wx. art. 320
(Vernon 1969). The state's power to discipline members of a statelicensed profession has been found constitutional. See, e.g., Barsky v.
Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S.
189 (1898).
46. See, e.g., In re Lytton, 48 Ill. 2d 390, 270 N.E.2d 32 (1971).
47. 537 F.2d at 677.
48. Can it be doubted that an attorney will conscientiously observe the
condition? After all, the alternative is incarceration.
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ment, a term of incarceration. Punished in this manner, the attorney would have been unable to practice before the state courts
whether or not the state decided he should be deprived of this right.
Upon examination, however, one discovers that this approach is
without merit. Merely because the federal judge may legally incarcerate the attorney, he does not thereby acquire the authority to
impose a lesser sentence that displaces power reserved by the
United States Constitution for use by state tribunals. 49 When the
federal judge restrains the convicted attorney from practicing in
the state courts, he determines an issue that only the state may
constitutionally decide.
B. Tenth Amendment Analysis
Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court declared that
"the right to control and regulate the granting of license to practice
law in the courts of a state is one of those powers which are not
transferred for its protection to the federal government." 50
Although this language would appear to foreclose any contentions
that a federal judge has the constitutional power to restrain a convicted attorney from practicing in the state tribunals, the Supreme
49. See United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d at 681:
Imprisonment obviously takes away the means of livelihood,
while providing minimum sustenance. Why, then, should the
lesser penalty be objectionable if the greater is not? The answer must be that the judge was exercising his discretion, and
that this must be done lawfully whatever the penalty.
See also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction
in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. Rnv. 1439 (1968); Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144
(1968); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1595
(1960). But see Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505 (1873). Robinson involved an attorney cited for contempt by a federal court judge. As
punishment for the contempt citation, the judge disbarred the attorney. On appeal, the Supreme Court first noted that a federal judge
may punish an attorney's violation of the federal contempt statute by
imposing a fine or a term of imprisonment. The Court went on to
state:
The power to disbar an attorney proceeds upon very different
grounds. This power is possessed by all courts which have
authority to admit attorneys to practice. But the power can
only be exercised where there has been such conduct on the
part of the parties complained of as shows them to be unfit
to be members of the profession ....

Before a judgment dis-

barring an attorney is rendered he should have notice of the
grounds of complaint against him and ample opportunity of
explanation and defence.
Id. at 512. Robinson is cited with approval by the Supreme Court
in Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 408 (1956).
50. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Well.) 130, 139 (1873).
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Court has not since that time asserted with the same directness
and force the tenth amendment's application to this problem. 51
Therefore, an examination of this issue will follow.
It is clear that the police power is reserved to the states by the
tenth amendment. 52 Implicit in the state's police power is the authority to regulate the professions. 5 But while a state may act
in furtherance of this power, its authority to do so has been limited
by the Supreme Court when it clashes with a validly asserted fed54
eral power. For example, in Sanitary District v. United States,
the federal government sought to enjoin an Illinois state agency
from controlling diversions of water from Lake Michigan. The federal government argued that because the state's action was lowering
the water level in the Great Lakes System, and since that system
was maintained by the federal government to facilitate the removal
of obstructions affecting interstate and foreign commerce, the desire
of the state to provide sewage disposal for its citizens must give
way to federal control of the lake. Writing for the Court, Mr.
Justice Holmes stated:
The [government's] main ground is the authority of the United
States to remove obstructions to interstate and foreign commerce.
There is no question that this power is superior to that of the
states to provide for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants
.55

56
In another case, Sperry v. Florida,
the Court flatly rejected
the argument that the tenth amendment reserves to the states the
power to regulate the practice of federal agency-related law within
their borders. Sperry was admitted to practice before the United
States Patent Office under regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Patents but was not authorized to practice law by the
state of Florida. Florida sued to enjoin him from practicing patent

51. The tenth amendment provides that: "The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. X.
52. Cf. THE FEDERALIST, No. 45 (J. Madison) 313 (J. Cooke ed. 1961): "The
powers reserved to the several states will extend to all the objects,
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and
properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State."
53. See, e.g., Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25, 25-26 (1961); Barsky v. Board
of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114, 121-22 (1889).
54. 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
55. Id. at 426. For a discussion of this decision, see Vandall, Constitutional
Issues in FederalNo-Fault, 27 MERcER L. REv. 273, 276-77 (1975).
56. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
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work in the state, claiming that his conduct constituted an unauthorized practice of law. The Supreme Court agreed that Sperry's
conduct was within the ambit of practicing law as defined by the
Florida courts, and that the state had a substantial interest in regulating this conduct. 57 But recognizing the history of the Patent
Office, congressional supremacy in the patents area,58 and the disruptive effects state regulation would have upon Patent Office proceedings, the Court held that Florida could not control Sperry's
patent work. 59 At the conclusion of its opinion, the Court turned
to Florida's tenth amendment arguments and "[found] them
singularly without merit." 60 Adopting the "truism" view of the
tenth amendment, which provides that "all is retained which has
not been surrendered," 61 the Court found that Congress had acted
57. Id. at 383-84.
58. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, para. 8.

59. The Sperry decision was based on the supremacy clause. U.S. CoNsT.
art. VI, para. 2. Congressional preeminence in the patent area made
the state's interest in the regulation of the profession irrelevant. 373
U.S. 383-85 (1963). See also Note, Retaining Out-Of-State Counsel:
The Evolution of a Federal Right, 67 COLum. L. REV. 731, 745 (1967).
Dependence on the supremacy clause to validate the power of a federal
judge to forbid an attorney from practicing law in state courts must
be founded on two premises: (1) The asserted federal authority must
be derived from some affirmative constitutional grant of power, e.g.,
the commerce clause, etc.; and (2) The displaced state authority must
not be protected by the tenth amendment. This article does not consider the first premise and attempts to counter the second. On preemption generally, see Verkuil, Preemption of State Law by the Federal Trade Commission, 1976 DuiE L.J. 225; Hirsch, Toward a New
View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515; Note, Preemption
as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STANr. L.

REv. 208 (1959).
60. 374 U.S. at 403.
61. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1940). See United
States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973) (an example of this interpretation of the tenth amendment). In Collier, a physician was
convicted in federal district court for his violation of a congressional
enactment proscribing the distribution of methadone while not acting
in the usual course of his professional practice. On appeal, the physician argued that this law invaded the state's residual police powers,
and specifically, the power to control the practice of medicine. To
this assertion, the court replied:
The Tenth Amendment does not operate upon a valid exercise
of power delegated to Congress by the Commerce Clause....
Congress could reasonably decide that in order to effectively
regulate interstate commerce in drugs, it was necessary to insure that persons within legitimate distribution channels, including dispensing physicians and pharmacists, did not divert
drugs into the illicit market.
Id. at 272-73 (footnotes omitted).
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within the scope of its constitutional power. Hence, the tenth
amendment was not transgressed despite the fact that regulation of
the legal profession was a matter normally within the control of
2
the states.
Countering the preceding two cases are two of the Court's most
recent pronouncements on this issue which have transformed the
tenth amendment from a truism into "an affirmative limitation on
the exercise of [federal] power."6 3 The first case, Fry v. United
States,64 involved the constitutionality of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, which authorized the President to stabilize wages
and salaries. The federal government sought to enjoin the state
of Ohio from granting wage increases to state employees in excess
of the allowable level established by the President. Although holding for the federal government, the Court presaged the future development of the tenth amendment by stating: "The Amendment
expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not
exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or
their ability to function effectively in a federal system." 6
The changing interpretation foreshadowed by Fry was completed in National League of Cities v. Usery.66 In that case, a 1974
62. One commentator suggests that the long range implications of Sperry
will be greater than its immediate significance. 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 86
(1964). The writer states that:
The special significance of Sperry lies in its impact on the conceptual view of the States' power to control practice of law.
The prior concept of unlimited power to regulate practice is
now circumscribed so that the States will not hinder the federal agencies' pursuit of their designated federal objectives.
"Since the court did not commit itself
on the scope of federal authority, the decision may be used as a stepping stone
for more severe limitations of the States' right in the regulation of the legal practice.
Id. at 90. For a contrary interpretation, see 1964 Du=E L.J. 190.
63. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841 (1976). For
a discussion of the changing interpretation of the tenth amendment
see generally Comment, An Affirmative Constitutional Right: The
Tenth Amendment and the Resolution of Federal Conflicts, 13 SAN
DIEGo L. REv. 876 (1976); Percy, National League of Cities v. Usery:
The Tenth Amendment is Alive and Doing Well, 51 TuLAN. L. REv.

95 (1976).
64. 421 U.S. 542 (1973).
65. Id. at 547 n.7.
66. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The Usery decision has provoked much scholarly
discussion. See, e.g., Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balancing National League of Cities, 11 GA. L. REv. 35 (1976);
60 MARQ. L. REv. 185 (1976); Lay, States' Rights: The Emergence of
a New Judicial Perspective, 22 S.D.L. REv. 1 (1977); Percy, supra note
63, at 95; 25 EMoRY L.J. 937 (1976). See also 42 Mo. L. REv. 114
(1977); Comment, The State Sovereignty Doctrine since National
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amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act extending statutory
minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to employees of the
states and their political subdivisions was found unconstitutional.
Congressional power to reach the wages and hours of state employees through the Commerce Clause was not questioned. Instead, the
Court held that the amendment was unconstitutional because it
"operate [d] to directly displace the States' freedom to structure in67
tegral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."
The Usery decision supports the assertion that the power of a
federal judge to order an attorney to refrain from the practice of
law in state courts infringes upon the state's tenth amendment
rights.68 Congressional displacement of the power of the states to
make decisions concerning fundamental and traditional state functions was basic to the Usery holding.69 One of the most fundamental and traditional state functions is the creation and regulation
of a judicial system.70 The state, in order to maintain the integrity
League of Cities v. Usery: A New ConstitutionalInterpretationUnder
the Commerce Clause, 81 DICK. L. REv. 599 (1977).
67. 426 U.S. at 852. Mr. Justice Brennan took the opposite view. He felt

that Congress had the same authority under the Commerce Clause to

deal with the states as it had to deal with private individuals. Id.
at 861-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In describing the radical posture
of the Court's holding, he cited Sperry v. Florida as a case that expressly rejected the Usery interpretation of the tenth amendment. Id.
at 863 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. In Usery, the Supreme Court found that Congress had the authority
under the Commerce Clause to regulate individual businesses in the
manner provided by the 1974 amendments; the constitutional infirmity
arose because Congress attempted to act upon "States as States." Id.
at 845. The Court's reasoning is similar to a position taken earlier in
this article. See note 41 and accompanying text supra. Congress may
regulate private individuals through the Commerce Clause; and a federal judge, through his immense sentencing powers, may control a major portion of a probationer's life. But neither Congress nor a federal
judge may constitutionally exercise these powers over an individual
in a way that acts to displace state decisionmaking authority protected
by the tenth amendment.
69. These employment decisions were found to be so important to the effective performance of the state government that if the state was deprived of the right to make them: (1) this deprivation would "substantially restructure traditional ways in which the local governments
have arranged their affairs" and (2) "there would be little left of the
States' 'separate and independent existence.'" Id. at 851 (citations
omitted).
70. One commentator wonders "how .

.

. one determine [s] what is and

what is not a 'traditional governmental function.'" Percy, supra note
63, at 105. But see 42 Mo. L. REv. 114, 121 (1977). See also 25 EMoRY
L.J. 937, 953 (1976). In Usery, the Court said that the area of funda-

mental state government decisions included the "States' [ability] to
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of this judicial system, regulates attorneys who practice within its
jurisdiction. This function is as important to the state's "separate
and independent existence" 7' as the wage and hour decisions were
found to be in Usery. 72 Accordingly, a federal judge cannot restrain an attorney from practicing in the state courts because such
action would impair "the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.17
C.

Federalism Analysis
The following discussion is based on considerations of federal4

ism. 7

To the extent that the professional life of an attorney de-

rives from a state-granted license authorizing the right to practice
in state courts, only the licensing state, in our federal system, has
structure employer-employee relationships in such areas as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation." 426 U.S. at 851. The Court noted, however, that these examples were not exhaustive. A brief examination of these examples
makes clear that they are all aspects of a broad attempt by the states
to provide basic services to their residents. Another basic service that
the states provide is a judicial system to manage conflicts arising between their citizens. Because in a structural sense attorneys are employees of the state's judicial system, the power to regulate these attorneys should be considered as a part of the basic services provided
by the state. Hence, the ability to regulate employer-employee relationships, and specifically attorneys in the state's judicial system,
could be included in the above list set out by the Court in Usery.
71. 426 U.S. at 851.
72. Although the huge costs that the states would be forced to incur as
a result of the 1974 amendments were important to the Usery decision,
congressional displacement of state power in an area fundamental to
the effective performance of state functions was the primary basis for
the decision. As the Court stated:
We do not believe particularized assessments of actual impact
are crucial to resolution of the issue presented ....

Thus,

even if appellants may have overestimated the effect which
the Act will have upon their current levels and patterns of
governmental activity, the dispositive factor is that Congress
has attempted to exercise its Commerce Clause authority to
prescribe minimum wages and maximum hours to be paid by
the states in their capacity as sovereign governments. In doing so, Congress has sought to wield its power in [an unconstitutional] fashion ....
Id. at 851-52.
73. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1974).
74. For a general discussion of federalism, see C. BLACK, PERSPECTIVES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 19-54 (1970); BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEcISIONMAKInG, 172-350 (1975); Hart, The Relations Between

State and Federal Law, 54 COLum. L. REv. 489 (1954); Wechsler, The
Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selections of the National Government, 54 CoLum.

L. REv. 543 (1954).
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the authority to control that professional life. There are three reasons supporting this view. The first reason is based upon Theard
v. United States,7 5 where the Supreme Court delineated the respective jurisdictions of the state and federal courts over the professional discipline of attorneys practicing before them. The Court
stated:
It is not for this Court, except within the narrow limits for review open to this Court ... to sit in judgment on [state] disbarments .... The two judicial systems of courts, the state judica-

tures and the federal judiciary, have autonomous control over the
conduct of their officers, among whom, in the present context,
lawyers are included. The court's control over a lawyer's professional life derives from his relation to the responsibilities of a
court.7 6

Thus, as defined by the Theard Court, and as required by our federal system,7 7 a federal judge has jurisdiction over the professional
life of an attorney only in relation to the attorney's responsibilities
to the federal court. Since the attorney's practice in state courts
is unrelated to his federal court responsibilities, his state court practice does not fall within the jurisdiction of the federal judge.
Therefore, the federal judge's order violates the constitutional principles enunciated in Theard to the extent that it 78
restrains the convicted attorney from practicing in the state courts.
The second argument involves an application of the Theard doctrine, which, not surprisingly, developed from Theard v. United
States.79 Historically, the states have performed the initial
examination for admission to the legal profession.8 0 Upon success75.
76.
77.
78.

354 U.S. 278 (1957).
Id. at 281.
MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1969).
The inherent power of a court to discipline the members of its own
bar is beyond question. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333
(1866). In Garland the court stated that "[f]rom [their] entry the
[attorneys] become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for
professional misconduct." Id. at 378. In Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 529 (1824), Mr. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that:
[I]t is extremely desirable that the respectability of the bar
should be maintained .... For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to reside in the Court. This
discretion ought to be exercised with moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised ....

S: * The power is one which ought to be exercised with
great caution, but which is, we think, incidental to all Courts,
and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and for the
respectability of the profession.
Id. at 530-31. See also 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 368, 369 (1973).
79. 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
80. In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286, 287 (1953); In re Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094,
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ful completion of this examination, an attorney is licensed by the
examining state.8 ' Because possession of this license confers the
right to practice only in the courts of the licensing state,82 the
Theard doctrine affords that state the plenary authority to regulate
the use of the license.8 3 Accordingly, when a state disciplines an
attorney by suspending his license to practice in its courts, the federal judiciary
cannot review the state's action except within narrow
84
confines.

81.
82.
83.

84.

1105 (3d Cir. 1975) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1038
(1975); A l. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 492
(1976).
Admission to practice before the federal courts is derived entirely from
the state licensing process. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 547 (1968).
See also 85 YALE L.J. 975, 976 (1976).
See Brakel & Loh, Regulating the Multistate Practice of Law, 50
WASH. L. REV. 699, 726 (1975).
In Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Miss. 1974), recent
graduates of law schools outside of Mississippi brought suit challenging
certain bar admission requirements pertaining to graduates of nonMississippi schools. The Theard doctrine was defined to mean "that
states control professional licensing to the exclusion of the federal
courts." Id. at 679 n.4. Compare Hopkins Federal Savings and Loan
Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935) with United States v. California, 281 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1960).
In Martin-Trigona v. Underwood, 529 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1975), for example, the court refused to overturn a state denial to the petitioner
of a license to practice law. Because the decision to license was primarily a state matter, the court's examination of the record ended
when it determined that no constitutional challenges existed. Id. at
35. See also, e.g., MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846, 846 (9th Cir. 1969)
("The [Theard doctrine] serves substantial policy interests arising
from the historic relationship between state judicial systems and the
members of their respective bars, and between the state and federal
judicial systems."); Ginger v. Circuit Court for County of Wayne, 372
F.2d 621, 625 (6th Cir. 1967) ("The courts of the State of Michigan
have exclusive jurisdiction over ... the regulation of the practice of
law, and the discipline and disbarment of attorneys, so far as the practice in the state courts is concerned....

The federal courts do not

have jurisdiction."); Clark v. Washington, 366 F.2d 678, 680 (9th Cir.
1966) ("The language of the Supreme Court in Theard suggests that
a state court disbarment may not be reviewed by a federal court, and
only under limited circumstances will the Supreme Court review such
an order.") (Subsequent to the Clark decision, in Law Student Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1970), the Supreme Court
held by implication that lower federal courts may review state court
disciplinary decisions to the same narrow extent that the Supreme
Court exercises such review.); Gately v. Sutton, 310 F.2d 107, 108 (10th
Cir. 1962) ("The Supreme Court of Colorado has exclusive jurisdiction
to admit attornegs to practice in the Colorado courts and to strike
them from the roll for misconduct."). See also Hawkins v. Moss, 503
F.2d 1171 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975); Jones v.
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The central theme of this doctrine is that the federal courts do
not have jurisdiction to pass on the merits of state professional licensing decisions. The power to make these decisions is granted
to the state that creates the license. When a federal judge decides
that a convicted attorney should refrain from engaging in the practice of law in state courts, he is passing on the merits of a licensing
decision, and, therefore, violates the Theard doctrine.
The third contention is based upon principles elicited from
Sperry v. Florida.85

The holding of Sperry, when stripped to its

bare analytic framework, prohibits an entity of one sovereignty
from directly limiting an attorney's professional practice before the
entities of another sovereignty. Viewing Sperry in this manner,
the following conclusion becomes evident: when a federal judge
imposes a probation condition requiring the attorney to refrain
from engaging in his state court practice, the judge acts upon the
attorney's right to practice before an entity of the state government.
But as mandated by the principles of Sperry, the federal judge cannot regulate the attorney's practice in entities belonging to another
sovereignty. Hence, the judge's imposition of this condition is
unconstitutional.
Thus, the reasons provided above take three different paths to
reach the same destination, namely, that a federal judge violates
Hulse, 391 F.2d 198 (8th Cir. 1968); Chaney v. State Bar of California,
386 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1967); Saier v. State Bar of Michigan, 293 F.2d
756 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 947 (1961); Star v. State
Bd., 159 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1947); Keeley v. Evans, 271 F. 520 (D.
Or. 1921).
The Theard doctrine has not been limited to licenses authorizing

the right to practice law. Haaf v. Board of County Comm'rs, 337 F.
Supp. 772 (D. Minn. 1971), involved a challenge to the denial of a
license "for the sale of beer and 'set-ups' and [to run] a dance
hall." Although the court found that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate various constitutional claims, it emphasized "that ...

the

function of federal courts [is not] to make decisions on the merits as
to the granting or denying of particular license applications." Id. at
778.
Federal courts are not barred by the Theard doctrine from hearing
constitutional challenges to state professional licensing decisions and
procedures. In Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Miss.
1974), the court stated "[s]ince plaintiffs' make not insubstantial
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, the so-called 'Theard Doctrine' .

.

. is inapplicable to defeat our jurisdiction.

Constitutional

claims are adjudicable in the federal courts in the professional licensing context as well as in other areas." Id. at 679 n.4. See also, e.g.,
Haaf v. Board of County Comm'rs, 337 F. Supp. 772 (D. Minn. 1971);
Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.E. Miss. 1971); Keenan v.
Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 135D (E.D.N.C. 1970).
85. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
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fundamental principles of federalism by restraining a convicted defendant from practicing in the state courts.8 6 The first assertion
acknowledges the autonomy possessed by each sovereign and points
out that this autonomy requires that each court system, state and
federal, must make independent decisions governing who may practice before their respective courts. The second assertion recognizes
that since the state creates the license that authorizes an attorney
to practice in its courts, only the state may act to limit the attorney's use of that license. Finally, the third contention demonstrates
87
the consistency of the first two assertions with Sperry v. Florida.
86. It should be noted that even if federal court action in this area was
not constitutionally barred, principles of abstention would demand

that the federal court refrain from taking action. Abstention would

be proper because federal court action would create conflict with a
state's own affairs and would hinder the state in resolving questions
of state law. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 218 (3d ed. 1976). For
recent decisions concerning federal court abstention in a constitutional
challenge to a state disciplinary complaint against an attorney, see
American Civil Liberties Union v. Bozardt, 539 F.2d 340 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 639 (1976); Tedesco v. O'Sullivan, 420 F. Supp.
194 (D. Conn. 1976).
87. 373 U.S. 379 (1963). An examination of an analogous issue also sheds
light on the problem dealt with in this section. This issue is the federal government's power to exert disciplinary control over the official
conduct of state government officials, and specifically, state court
judges. In Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947),
the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of section 12 of the
Hatch Act. This section of the Act authorized the federal Civil Service
Commission to suspend or remove certain state government public employees from office if the Commission found that the employees were
engaged in activities involving political partisanship. Oklahoma,

which based its challenge to the Act on the tenth amendment, asserted

that section 12 was unconstitutional because it provided for "possible
forfeiture of state office [and this constituted] an interference with
the reserved powers of the state." Id. at 142 (emphasis in original).
Although the Court avoided the state's tenth amendment assertion and
thereby upheld the constitutionality of section 12, it did assert that
"the United States is not concerned with, and has no power to regulate,
local political activities as such of state officials." Id. at 143.
Although state court judges are officers of the state government,
one may reasonably doubt that the Supreme Court meant to imply
that the activities of state court judges should be included within the
phrase "political activities." If this is correct, state judges would not
be shielded from federal government regulation by Oklahoma v. Civil
Service Comm'n. But despite this, federal regulation of state judges
is blocked by the Constitution itself. The framers of the Constitution
were obviously aware of the existence of state court judges. State

court judges are directly acknowledged in the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and the Supremacy Clause. If the framers had intended that

state court judges be regulated by the federal government, they prob-

ably would have included language to that effect within the Constitution. In fact, when viewing the absence of a specific grant of power
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D.

Federal Regulation of the Legal Profession

Despite the above arguments, in recent years the federal government has become increasingly involved in the direct regulation of
the legal profession. 8 In order to defeat any lingering claims that
a federal judge may legally exert control over a convicted attorney's
professional life in state courts, this involvement must be explained.
The federal government's inroads have occurred mainly in two
areas: first, through court action designed to compel the implementation of constitutional requirements and safeguards in existing
state regulatory mechanisms; and second, through regulation of the
profession as an economic entity.
1.

Implementation of ConstitutionalRequirements

The federal courts, through the fourteenth amendment, have
held that certain state action regulating members of the legal proto the federal government to regulate state judges together with the
presence of the tenth amendment, one may infer that the framers implicitly denied the federal government the power to regulate state
court judges. As noted by a passage from the Federalist: "There is
one transcendent advantage belonging to the province of the State
governments. . . I mean the ordinary administration of criminal and
civil justice."

THE FEDERAMST No. 17 (A. Hamilton) 107 (J. Cooke ed.

1961).
This quote from the Federalist illuminates the framers' intention
to leave the basic judicial function to the states. The regulation of
those serving as cogs in the machinery activated to provide this function is an inextricable part of the "administration of criminal and civil
justice." Hence, the professional conduct of state court judges, as cogs
in the judicial machinery, was designated by the framers to be regulated by the states.
The value of the analogy to state court judges now becomes clear.
As the Supreme Court has declared, attorneys "are officers of the
court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing
sufficient legal learning and fair private character." Ex parte Garland, 71-U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378 (1866). Cf. Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) ("[L]awyers are essential to the primary
governmental function of administering justice ..

. .").

But see In

re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973). They are, in other words, just
as state court judges, cogs in the state's judicial machinery. So just
as state court judges, attorneys cannot be regulated by the federal government insofar as their state court practice is concerned.
88. See Cheatham, The Supreme Court and the Profession of Law, 14
CATH. U.L. Rzv. 192, 214 (1965). The author believes that the course
charted by recent Supreme Court decisions may eventually bring the
legal profession under federal control to the same extent that big business and organized labor have become federally controlled through,
respectively, the Sherman Act and the National Labor Relations Act.
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fession violates the first 9 and fifth90 amendments. One commentator suggests that these decisions signify the courts' dissatisfaction with the performance of the legal profession or that they
reflect larger social concerns of the 1950's and 1960's. 9 1 Without
appraising the merits of these assertions, it may be safely assumed
that the implementation of constitutional safeguards indicates no
wholesale attempt by the federal government to regulate the practice of law.92 Even accepting the premise that these decisions mandate that the federal courts assume a larger role in the adjudication
of constitutional challenges to state regulatory procedures, the decisions surely do not grant federal courts the power to decide state
professional disciplinary matters not involving constitutional infirmities. 93

But as recent cases demonstrate, 94 federal courts have colossal
authority to find violations of the fourteenth amendment and to re89. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977); Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
90. Spevack v. Abrams, 38 5 U.S. 511 (1967).
91. A.I. KAUFmAN, PROBLEMS iN LEGAL RESPoNsIBnrry 491 (1976).
92. The cautious deference accorded to the states in this area is implied
in Brown v. Supreme Court of Virginia, 359 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Vir.
1973), aff'd sub nom. Titus v. Supreme Court of Virginia, 414 U.S. 1034
(1973), where the court declared:
These cases involve an area of state-federal relations; namely,
the right of a state to establish standards for admission to the
bar-a field into which the federal court should be especially
reluctant and slow to enter, but one in which there is a duty
to investigate in appropriate cases.
Id. at 551.
Similar sentiments were echoed in Prosch v. Baxley, 345 F. Supp.
1063, 1066 (M.D. Ala. 1972):
Matters relating to the qualification of persons to pursue their
livelihoods are reserved to the State under the Tenth Amendment, and the Federal Government should interfere only
when the States' exercise of such jurisdiction infringes on
rights protected by the Federal Constitution. In that event,
a comparison of the weight of the conflicting constitutional
infringements may be in order.
93. See, e.g., Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350
(E.D.N.C. 1970).
94. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (action challenging
a Tennessee state apportionment statute. The plaintiffs alleged that
the statute violated their fourteenth amendment rights. The Supreme
Court held that the case presented a valid claim for relief and remanded it to the district court for a determination of the fourteenth
amendment issue); James v. Wallace, 382 F. Supp. 1177 (M.D. Ala.
1974) (suit against state officials and prison authorities based on
alleged violations of the eighth amendment; the court found that the
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quire that the states abide by the structures of that amendment.
Conceivably, a federal court might hold that the fourteenth amendment rights belonging to the clients of an attorney are violated if
that attorney is allowed to continue practicing law, whether in the
state or federal courts, after being convicted of a federal felony. 5
Two reasons are offered to illustrate that such a holding is unlikely.
First, in cases decided thus far, where a fourteenth amendmentbased challenge to state regulation of the legal profession has been
sustained, the challenge has always involved an appeal from a
denial or revocation by a state of a license to practice law within
its borders. 96 Second, even if a federal judge, presiding over a trial
plaintiffs, inmates in a state prison, stated a cause of action on which
relief could be granted).
95. Although no federal court has made this finding, the Supreme Court
has stated: "A state could not, by invoking the power to regulate the
professional conduct of attorneys, infringe in any way the right of individuals and the public to be fairly represented in lawsuits authorized
by Congress to effectuate a basic public interest." Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
96. See, e.g., Saier v. State Bar of Michigan, 293 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 947 (1961). In Saier, because the state took no
action on a complaint that the plaintiff filed, which charged four attorneys with misconduct, the plaintiff claimed that his constitutional
rights under the fourteenth amendment had been violated. The federal court dismissed the suit stating that it lacked jurisdiction.
See also, Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n, 160 F.2d 96
(6th Cir. 1947). In Glickcer the state denied an applicant's request for
a liquor license. The applicant brought suit alleging that her fourteenth amendment rights were violated because of this denial. The
court stated that:
We recognize the right of a state to regulate, or even prohibit,
through the exercise of its police power, the pursuit of certain
businesses and occupations which because of their nature may
prove injurious or offensive to the public ....

But it is

equally well settled that such regulation is not unlimited in
scope, but is subject to the limitations imposed by [the fourteenth amendment]. While the Federal Government does not
have the right to regulate such matters, which are exclusively
under the control and regulation of the state, yet it does have
the right, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent
such regulation from being arbitrary or discriminatory.
Id. at 100.
The probation condition power dealt with herein involves direct
regulation of the profession by a federal judge, not indirect action by
the federal judge to redress arbitrary or discriminatory state regulation. Addressing this issue in United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675,
684 (2d Cir. 1976) (concurring opinion), Judge Lumbard declared
that:
So far as protection of the public is concerned, I think it is
obvious that the courts and the profession have been far too
lax in imposing sanctions where there has been substantial
basis for doing so. But that is not a matter where the federal
courts have any right or duty to lead the way.
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where an attorney has been convicted of a federal felony, wants
to find that the attorney's continued practice of law in the state
courts is proscribed by the fourteenth amendment, he lacks the authority to do so because the focuses of a federal felony prosecution
and an attorney disciplinary proceeding involve different issues.
An attorney disciplinary proceeding assesses the attorney's moral
character at the time of the hearing. In contrast, the primary inquiry of a felony prosecution is directed solely to the attorney's
prior conduct. Hence, because of these different focuses, the federal
judge, in a felony prosecution, would lack jurisdiction to determine
the attorney's present fitness to practice law.9 7
Lastly, it may be contended that Congress could decide that to
allow a federally convicted attorney to practice law in state courts
would violate the fourteenth amendment. On the basis of this finding, pursuant to its power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, 98 Congress could enact a statute resembling the provision of
S. 1437, § 2103(b) (6).19 The Supreme Court's decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan'"0 lends guidance in assessing the merit of this contention. In that case, a statute prohibiting the use of literacy tests
to determine eligibility to vote was challenged. Upholding the
validity of the statute, the Court stated that Congress could enforce
97. See Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 408 n.7 (1956); Ex parte
Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1873). Robinson stands for the
proposition that while a federal judge may punish an attorney for the
commission of an illegal act, and while he may also control the attorney's federal court practice, he cannot legally perform the former
function in a way that is directed at the latter. Even though the judge
has the authority to discipline the attorney in both areas, as Robinson
points out, he may not attempt to do both at the same time because
his power to act in each area is based on a different ground. Applying
this reasoning to the problem dealt with in this article, the tenth
amendment and federalism issues herein discussed need not even be
considered. Although the judge may punish the convicted attorney
for his violation of federal law and may at some future time discipline
the attorney professionally because of his unlawful conduct, the judge
cannot do both at the same time because the authority for imposing
punishment in each area is provided by a different source. If the federal judge may not limit the attorney's federal practice through the
use of his probation power, he surely is not able to reach the attorney's
state court practice by the same means. See also note 49 supra.
98. Section five of the fourteenth amendment states: "The Congress shall
have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article." For a general discussion of this issue see Nichol, An
Examination of Congressional Powers Under § 5 of the 14th Amendment, 52 No=x DAME LAW. 175 (1976).
99. See notes 9-17 and accompanying text supra.
100. 384U.S. 641 (1966).
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the commands of the fourteenth amendment through its power

under section five of that amendment. 10 1
The Morgan result is inapposite here for two reasons. First, the
legislative history of the statute considered there indicated that
Congress had exhaustively assessed and weighed the various conflicting constitutional considerations involved in the use of literacy
tests. With respect to section 2103 (b) (6), however, no substantial
discussion of the constitutional factors appears in the legislative history. Second, the Usery decision may have limited congressional
power under section five of the fourteenth amendment to the same
extent that it limited the authority of Congress to act under the
commerce clause.10 2 Thus, if Congress passed a proposal identical
101. Id. at 652-53.
102. The Supreme Court in Usery stated that it did not express the view
that congressional power under section five of the fourteenth amendment was limited by its decision. 426 U.S. at 853. But as one commentator pointed out:
[S]ince the FLSA amendments could be considered to have
a legitimate fourteenth amendment nexus .. . [c]ould it not

be maintained that § 5 of the fourteenth amendment was being utilized by the Congress to rectify the denial of equal protection that results from state employees, being disadvantaged
vis-a-vis comparable employees in the private sector?"
Percy, supranote 63, at 106 n.53.
But cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), where the Supreme
Court, per Mr. Justice Rehnquist, stated that:
[W] e think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principles
of state sovereignty which it embodies . . . are necessarily

limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In that section Congress is expressly granted
authority to enforce "by appropriate legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority. When
Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section
of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their
own terms embody limitations on state authority. We think
that Congress may, in determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or
state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in
other contexts.
Id. at 456 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
Although this sweeping language deals only with the relationship
between section five of the fourteenth amendment and the eleventh
amendment, it could, arguably, be extended to the tenth amendment
as some commentators have suggested. See, e.g., Baker, Federalism
and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. COL. L. Rsv. 139, 171-72 (1977);
Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balancing National
League of Cities, 11 GA. L. Rsv. 35, 67 (1976); Comment, The State
Sovereignty Doctrine Since National League of Cities v. Usery: A
New Constitutional Interpretation Under the Commerce Clause, 81
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or similar to section 2103(b) (6), this enactment would be unconstitutional because it would infringe upon the states' reserved
power to regulate the legal profession.
This position is bolstered by Oregon v. Mitchell.103 The statute
considered in Mitchell lowered the minimum voting age to eighteen
years for persons voting in United States elections. Turning its
attention to the segment of the statute which applied to state and
municipal elections, the Supreme Court declared:
No function is more essential to the separate and independent existence of the states and their governments than the power to determine ... the qualifications of their own voters for state, county,
and municipal offices and104the nature of their own machinery for
filling local public offices.
Hence, even though Congress based its authority to lower the voting
age on section five of the fourteenth amendment, the portion of
the statute affecting state and municipal elections was found unconstitutional. Because the authority to regulate the legal profession
is also essential to the states' separate and independent existence,
Mitchell deems that Congress cannot, even under its section five
power, authorize a federal judge to exert control over a convicted
attorney's state court practice.
2.

Regulation of the Professionas an Economic Entity

The Supreme Court, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,0 5 held
that a minimum fee schedule promulgated by a local bar association and enforced by the state bar violated the Sherman Act.'0 6
More recently, the Court determined that outright bans against attorney advertising violated the first amendment.' 0 7 These actions

Dicx. L. REv. 599, 623-25 (1977); 60

103.
104.
105.
106.

107.

MARQ. L. REV. 185, 199 (1976).
Such an extension would undeniably allow Congress to implement
§ 2103(b) (6), or similar legislation, through its § 5 power. But see
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). In order to take this action,
however, Congress would have to demonstrate that it considered the
relevant constitutional issues involved. See note 101 supra and related
text.
400 U.S. 112 (1970).
Id. at 125.
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
Id. at 793; see United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507
(D. Or. 1974), dismissed as moot, 405 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Or. 1975). For
commentary on the Goldfarb decision, see Branca & Steinberg, supra
note 15, at 477-92; Comment, Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules
and the Antitrust Laws, 1974 DuKE L.J. 1164; Comment, Fee Schedules and Suggested Alternatives: Reflections on a Sherman Exemption that Doesn't Exist, 3 U.C.L.A.-ALASMA L. REV. 207 (1974).
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977). For commen-
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may indicate a growing awareness by the federal government
that
08
the states are inefficiently regulating the market place.
Since inefficient governance of the market place is not involved
in decisions concerning the continued fitness of an attorney to practice in state courts, this federal economic regulation does not support a federal judge's intrusion into this area.h 9 As the Supreme
Court stated in Goldfarb: "In holding that certain anticompetitive
conduct by lawyers is within the reach of the Sherman Act we intend no diminution of the authority of the state to regulate its
professions."" 0 This statement signifies that while the Court may
disfavor certain economic practices perpetuated by the state bar
association, this disapproval does not extend to other areas of bar
regulation, among which is included the regulation of attorneys
convicted in federal forums."'

108.
109.

110.

111.

tary on the attorney advertising and solicitation question, see Agate,
The Inevitability of Advertising, 81 CASE & COMM. 3, 9-10 (1976);
Branca & Steinberg, supra note 15, at 505-21; Rigler, Professional
Codes of Conduct After Goldfarb: A Proposed Method of Antitrust
Analysis, 29 Aim. L. REv. 185 (1975); Sfika, Arizona Court Upholds
Advertising Prohibition,65 ILL. B.J. 99 (1976).
See Verkuil, Preemption of State Law by the Federal Trade Commission, 1976 DuKE L.J. 225, 226.
As one author noted: "The regulation of the Bar and the practice of
law is unlike the regulation of barbers or physicians for the very reason that the courts and the general administration of justice are so
inextricably affected." Bennett, Non-Lawyers and the Practiceof Law
Before State and FederalAgencies, 46 A.B.A. J. 705, 706 (1960).
421 U.S. at 793.
This declaration was affirmed in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97
S. Ct. 2691 (1977). There the Court, although sustaining a first
amendment challenge, rejected a Sherman Act assault because allowing it "would have precisely that undesired effect" carefully avoided
in Goldfarb (i.e., the diminution of state authority to regulate the legal
professions). Id. at 2697 n.11.
Further delimiting its holding, the Court stated:
The constitutional issue in this case is only whether the
State may prevent the publication in a newspaper of appellants' truthful advertisement concerning the availability and
terms of routine legal services. We rule simply that the flow
of such information may not be restrained, and we therefore
hold the present application of the disciplinary rule against
appellants to be violative of the First Amendment.
Id. at 2709.
But as Mr. Justice Powell pointed out in dissent: "The constitutionalizing-indeed the affirmative encouraging-of competitive price
advertising of specified legal services will substantially inhibit the experimentation that has been underway [through federalism] and also
will limit the control heretofore exercised over lawyers by the respective states." Id. at 2719 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Some commentators have suggested that the rationale for state pro-
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Summation

The preceding discussion has asserted that a federal judge does
not have the constitutional authority to restrain a convicted attorney, as a condition of probation, from practicing in the state courts.
If a federal judge orders such a condition of probation, his decision
is unconstitutional under either a tenth amendment or federalism
12
analysis.'

IV. CONCLUSION
The fundamental factor ... is that the States reserved, among
other powers, that of regulating the practice of professions within
their own borders. If that concept has less validity now than in
the 18th century when it was made part of the "bargain" to create
a federal union, it is nonetheless part of that compact.113
mulgated restraints on nonlocal counsel is to provide economic protection for the local bar. See generally Brakel & Loh, Regulating the
Multistate Practice of Law, 50 WASH. L. REV. 699 (1975); Note, Retaining Out-of-State Counsel: The Evolution of a Federal Right, 67
COLUm. L. REV. 731 (1967); Note, Attorneys: Interstate and Federal
Practice, 80 HAnv. L. REV. 1711 (1967). Although a state regulation
of this type was upheld in Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961), in
view of the Court's recent economic concerns these restrictions may
be vulnerable targets.
112. How can a federal judge limit the practice of law by an attorney who
has been convicted of a federal felony? He can suspend the attorney's
right to practice in federal courts. The most, though, that a federal
judge may constitutionally do to limit the attorney's state court practice is to implement a procedure whereby the appropriate state mechanism is notified of the attorney's conviction at the time he is sentenced for the federal offense. See Hearings on the Reform of the Federal Criminal Law Before the Subcomm. of Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. XI at 7811 (1975) (testimony of John K. Van de Kamp, Federal
Public Defender, and Susan Harris, Deputy Federal Public Defender).
The state mechanism must then be left to take whatever it considers to be the proper action.
113. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 730 (1973) (dissenting opinion). See 42
Mo. L. REv. 114 (1977):
The recognition by the Court that Congress' commerce power
is subject to a "state sovereignty" limitation is a significant
step toward the preservation of the vitality of our federal system of government ....

This constitutional limitation safe-

guards the continued ability of the states to engage in independent decision-making in certain areas of activity. The importance of that ability to the prevention of the abuse of
power by the federal government has been recognized, not
only in the current political mood, but by the authors of the
Constitution.
Id. at 121 (footnotes omitted).
But cf. Lay, States' Rights: The Emergence of a New Judicial Perspective, 22 S.D.L. Ray. 1, 13 (1977) (author implies that the states
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This principle, recently espoused by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, recognizes the basic issue at stake. A federal incursion on state power
in this area may have "a salutary result, and [may have] a sufficiently rational relationship to commerce to validate [it]."114
But because such conduct would displace the states' freedom to
structure their integral operations in an area of traditional governmental functions, federal intervention is impermissible. 115 Thus,
the states must retain the sole power to regulate the practice of
law in state courts, not necessarily because they are especially wellsuited for this task, but because that is what the Constitution requires.
are afforded the protections of federalism only if the federal judiciary

is satisfied that they "are adequately performing" their constitutional

duties).
114. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 849 (1976).
115. Id. at 852.

